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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellants have appealed a final order of the district court. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)0), 78-2-2(4).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
In their docketing statement, Appellants' contend that there are eighteen separate
appealable issues in this case. [Docketing Statement, at 10-15.] In their opening brief, Appellants'
have reduced those claims to seven. [Opening Brief of Appellants, at 1-3 ("App. Br.").] A review
of the record, however, reveals that there are only two issues on appeal:
Issue Number 1: Did the trial court properly dismiss plaintiffs' claims on the basis that
the Trustees of the Association are not liable for the contracts of the Association because the
plaintiffs did not allege that the Trustees breached the applicable standard of care in discharging
their duties as Trustees?
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss is a
question of law which this Court reviews for correctness. Tiede v. Utah Dep't of Corrections, 915
P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996).
Preservation of the Issue: [R. 289-90, 294-96; 462.]
Issue Number 2: Does the Utah Nonprofit Corporation and Co-Operative Association Act
(the "Nonprofit Corporation Act") provide the appropriate standard of care for trustees of a
homeowners association incorporated under the Utah Nonprofit Corporation Act?
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Standard of Review: Interpretation of a statute is a question of law which the reviewing
court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. Stephens
v. Bonneville Travel Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 1997 (Utah 1997).
Preservation of the Issue: [R. 289; 462-64]
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-107(1).
A trustee or officer of a nonprofit corporation is not personally liable to the
corporation or its members for civil claims arising from acts or omissions
made in the performance of his duties as a trustee or officer, unless the acts
or omissions are the result of his intentional misconduct.

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-35(1).
The provisions of [the Utah Condominium Act] shall be in addition and
supplemental to all other provisions of law, statutory or judicially declared,
provided that wherever the application of the provisions of this act conflict
with the application of such other provisions, this act shall prevail....
STAi EMENT OF THE CASE

1.

Nature of the Case.

In this case, Appellants, owners of condominiums in the American Towers Condominium
Project, have sued their neighbors in their capacities as past and present voluntary members of the
Board of Trustees ("Trustees") of the American Towers Association (the "Association"), a Utah
nonprofit corporation. Appellants challenge the Trustees' decision to pursue and fund litigation
against the builders and developers of the project on behalf of the Association and for the benefit
of the Association. Although Appellants seek in this litigation to obtain personal judgment against
these current and former Trustees, Appellants have not alleged that these individuals profited in
any way from their management of this nonprofit organization. The Trustees are alleged to have
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acted negligently, with gross negligence and contrary to the Association's Declaration and Bylaws.
They are not alleged to have engaged in intentional misconduct.
The Trustees are alleged to have approved litigation against CCI Mechanical, Inc. ("CO
Mechanical") to recover millions of dollars from them to repair the substantial defects in the
building's mechanical system. These defects effect the entire project. To fund this litigation, the
Trustees are alleged to have used the Association's reserve account, the account into which the
proceeds derived from the litigation would be deposited. The Trustees are alleged to have used
reserves on the advice of the Association's outside accountants and lawyers.
The Trustees moved to dismiss Appellants' Complaint on the basis that under Utah law,
trustees of a nonprofit organization are not liable except in circumstances where they engage in
"intentional misconduct." Which means that such volunteers are liable only if they intentionally
do something they know to be wrong. Because the Appellants have never alleged that these
Trustees engaged in intentional misconduct, the district court dismissed the Appellees' Complaint
but granted Appellees' Leave to Amend to add a claim of intentional misconduct. Appellees
elected not to amend but instead chose to pursue this appeal.
2.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

On June 10, 1996, Defendants/Appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Verified
Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted. A hearing was held
on Defendants/Appellees' motion on August 9, 1996, before the Honorable David S. Young.
After hearing arguments of counsel, Judge Young ruled that Defendants/Appellees' Motion to
Dismiss would be granted. [R. 497, 374.] On August 21, 1997, the Order Granting Motion to
Dismiss was entered. The Order provides that the Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint was dismissed,
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with prejudice, with leave to amend to assert only claims of intentional misconduct. [R. 375-76.]
The Court specifically found that "the only applicable standard of care for directors or trustees of a
Utah nonprofit condominium association is intentional misconduct." [R. 376.] Appellants elected
not to amend their complaint. The instant appeal followed.
3.

Statement of Facts.

The operative documents in this case—the American Towers Declaration and Bylaws—are
before the Court and any gloss which the parties may add is superfluous and improper.
Appellants' Statement of Facts, however, contains just such a gloss on various provisions of the
operative documents as well as numerous inappropriate legal conclusions which are not "facts."
Accordingly, Appellees submit the following Statement of Facts:
1.

American Towers is a condominium project located at 44 West Broadway, Salt

Lake City, Utah, which contains both commercial and residential units. [R. at 61-63, 197.]
2.

The Association is a Utah "nonprofit" corporation. [R. at 101, 197.]

3.

The Board of Trustees (the "Board") of the Association manages the property,

affairs, and business of the Association. [R. at 101, 197.]
4.

Appellants are members of the Association and owners of condominium units at

American Towers. [R. at 196.]
5.

Appellees John Zinn, Sandra Ridges, Glen Getz, Bill Melville, William S.

Richards, Judith Anderson Giesa, Joan Holmes, William T. Matlock, Don Clark, Sterling Rigby,
Wayne Lantz, Von Callister, Brian Jeppson, Kim Hibbert, Glen McKay, Mike Jones, Johnny
Bowne, Victor Romero, Craig Thorley, Norman J. Salisbury, and Spencer Kimball are alleged to
be past and present directors and members of the Board. [R. at 197.]
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6.

Construction on American Towers began in 1981. [R. at 198.]

7.

CCI Mechanical was the mechanical subcontractor that designed and constructed

the mechanical,,plumbing, fire protection, heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems. [R.
at 198.]
8.

In 1991, the Association filed a complaint against CCI Mechanical and other

defendants for faulty construction (the "CCI Litigation"). [R. at 199.]
9.

In Declaration Article XIX titled "Mortgagee Protection," the Association is to

provide for establishment of an adequate reserve:
Section 19.05. Revenue Fund And Working Capital Fund Required. The
Association shall establish an adequate reserve to cover the cost of reasonably
predictable and necessary repairs and replacements of the Common Areas and any
component thereof and shall cause such reserve to be funded by regular monthly or
other periodic assessments against the Condominiums rather than by Special
Assessments.
[Decl. § 19.05 (R. at 84).]
10.

No other provision of the Declaration or Bylaws mentions or refers to a reserve

fund or directs how or under what procedures the Association's reserves are to be used. [See R. at
47-110.]
11.

Pursuant to Declaration Article 10.03 the Association has the following power:

The Association may obtain and pay for the services of such personnel as the
Association shall determine to be necessary or desirable for the proper operation of
the Project, whether such personnel are furnished or employed directly by the
Association or by any person with whom it contracts. The Association may obtain
and pay for legal and accounting services necessary or desirable in connection with
the operation of the Project or the enforcement of this Declaration. In addition to
the foregoing, the Association may acquire and pay for out of the Common Expense
Fund water, sewer, garbage collection, electrical, gas, and other necessary or
desirable utility services for the Common Areas (and for the Units to the extent not
separately metered or billed), insurance, bonds, and other goods and services
common to the Units; provided, however, that any such item which is separately
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metered or billed and which relates exclusively to the Residential Limited Common
Areas or the Commercial Limited Common Areas shall be paid for, respectively,
out of the Special Residential Fund or the Special Commercial Fund. (Emphasis
added.)
[Decl. at § 10.03 (R. at 66-67, 202).]
12.

Declaration Article 10.08 also grants the Association all necessary implied powers:

10.08 Implied Rights. The Association may exercise any right, power, or privilege
given to it expressly by this Declaration or by law, and every other right or privilege
reasonably implied from the existence of any right or privilege given to it herein or
reasonably necessary to effectuate any such right or privilege.
[Decl. at § 10.08 (R. at 68).]
13.

Allegedly on the advice of a lawyer and an accountant, the Board used funds from

the Association's reserves to finance the CCI Litigation. [R. at 212.]
14.

By an Order dated September 19, 1994, Judge Dennis Frederick granted summary

judgment against the Association in the CCI Litigation, in part, based upon statutes of limitations.
[R. at 199.]
15.

The Association appealed that decision to the Utah Supreme Court. [R. at 200.]

16.

On December 20, 1996, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's summary

judgment. American Towers Owners Ass'n. v. CCI Mech.. Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996).
17.

Appellants allege that the Trustees misappropriated approximately $750,000 from

the reserves to finance the CCI Litigation. [R. at 200.]
18.

Appellants asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing, negligence, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and corporate
mismanagement and waste of assets but have not alleged any intentional misconduct by the
Trustees. [R. at 217-32.]
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19.

Appellants assert that the Declaration, entered into by American Towers, Inc. and

Block 58 Associates, the Association's Articles of Incorporation ("Articles"), and Bylaws form a
contract between and among the Association, the owners and the Board. [R. at 219.]
20.

Appellants allege that the Board has a contractual duty to comply "strictly" with the

Articles, Bylaws, and Declaration. The contractual source of this duty is alleged to be Declaration
Article XVII § 18.01, which provides: "Each Owner shall comply strictly with the provisions of
this Declaration, the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of the Association . .. ." [R. at 218-19.]
21.

Appellants seek an accounting of the source and monies used to finance the CCI

Litigation and the dates and minutes of the Board's meetings at which the Board voted to use
money from the Common Expense Fund or the Reserve Fund to finance the CCI Litigation. [R. at
234-35.]
22.

Appellants state their right under Utah law to inspect the books and records of the

Association, but do not allege that this right has ever previously been asserted or denied. [R. at
235.]
23.

Appellants allege that the law imposes a constructive trust on the defendants

because of their alleged breach of fiduciary duty. [R. at 234-35.]
24.

On May 29, 1996, Defendants/Appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to

State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted. [R. at 278.]
25.

On August 9, 1996, after a hearing on Defendants/Appellees Motion to Dismiss, the

district court granted Defendants/Appellees' Motion. [R. at 374-76.]
26.

On September 11, 1996, Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal. [R. at 380.]
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under Utah law, volunteer directors of nonprofit corporations such as the Association incur
liability to the corporation only if they engage in intentional misconduct. Utah law further
provides that nonprofit corporations can "sue and be sued." In this case, the volunteer directors of
the American Towers Association, acting on behalf of the Association, pursued litigation against a
contractor who had performed faulty work on the American Towers Project. Six of the over 300
American Towers owners, purportedly on behalf of the Association, brought suit against the
Trustees of the Association, seeking to impose personal liability on these directors, for their
decision to fund the litigation on behalf of the Association.1 Appellants have never alleged,
however, that the Trustees engaged in intentional misconduct,2 and it is plain that, under the law,

1

There is a significant question regarding the propriety of this "derivative" action.
Under Utah law, a derivative action is inappropriate where "the injury is one to the plaintiff as a
stockholder and to him individually, and not to the corporation." Richardson v. Arizona Fuels
Corp.. 614 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1980). Appellants, however, claim that the Trustee's alleged
misconduct has "caused Homeowners substantial actual damages" and "have caused
Homeowners depreciation in the fair market value of their condominiums." App. Br. at 5. These
claimed damages are to six individuals, not the Association.
2

Appellants have never claimed that the Trustees engaged in intentional
misconduct. Nevertheless, without ever signing pleadings making such a claim, see Utah R. Civ.
P. 11, Appellants now assert to this Court that "the Complaint's alleged facts and gross
negligence claims do assert intentional misconduct in that the Trustees knowingly, intentionally
and repeatedly acted ultra vires . . . ." App. Br. at 35.
This statement is patently incorrect. In Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co.. 793 P.2d
897 (Utah 1990), the Supreme Court held that "'willful misconduct,' in a tort context is not
equivalent to gross negligence or reckless indifference, mental states where constructive
knowledge suffices for liability." In re Worthen. 926 P.2d 853, 868 (Utah 1996) (citing Golding.
793 P.2d at 901). Thus, Appellants' claim that the Complaint's allegations of "gross negligence"
suffice to plead intentional misconduct is legally incorrect. Moreover, as discussed in detail
below, Appellants' assertion that the Trustees acted ultra vires not only confuses a standard of
care with the concept of corporate authority, but it also suffers from a faulty legal premise as to
what constitutes an ultra vires act. Accordingly, Appellants are raising, for the first time in this
appeal, the issue of "intentional misconduct."
morgan\plead\amto wbri .627
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these Trustees have done nothing improper. Accordingly, each and every claim raised by
Appellants fails as a matter of law and the district court properly dismissed the action pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Notwithstanding Appellants' convoluted arguments, this case, at its heart, is quite simple.
The Trustees of the Association, pursuant to their charge to manage the affairs of the Association,
and on behalf of the Association, opted to pursue litigation against CCI Mechanical for faulty work
done on the American Towers Condominium Project. The Appellants have never claimed that the
Board exceeded its authority in pursuing that litigation on behalf of the Association. The
Association, acting through the Board, financed the litigation from the Association's reserve funds.
Appellants claim that the CCI Litigation should have been funded from another Association fund,
the Common Expense Fund. As a result of their disagreement with the Board's funding decision,
these disgruntled homeowners filed the instant lawsuit.
While claiming that the Trustees are individually liable to repay the funds expended on the
CCI Litigation, Appellants have not claimed that the Trustees, or any one of them, acted in bad
faith, fraudulently, with an intent to deceive, or with intentional misconduct. Nor have Appellants
alleged that any Trustee derived a secret profit, engaged in self dealing, or broke the law. The sole
basis for this lawsuit and the instant appeal is Appellants' contention that the Trustees should have
taken money to finance the CCI Litigation from the Common Expense Fund rather than the reserve

It is well settled that "matters not put in issue before the trial court may not be raised for
the first time on appeal." Wade v. Stangl. 869 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see State v.
Mohi. 901 P.2d 991, 1001 (Utah 1995); Warren v. Provo Citv Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 n.4
(Utah 1992) ("With limited exceptions, our practice has been to decline consideration of issues
raised for the first time on appeal."). This Court is urged to disregard, therefore, Appellants'
belated and suspect claim of intentional misconduct.
morgan\plead\amto wbn. 62 7
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funds.3 Thus, it is the propriety of that action, and that action only, that is currently before the
Court.
Once the Court culls through the Appellants' legally unsupported arguments and critically
examines the plethora of "issues" Appellants purport to raise, it is clear that this case involves two,
and only two, questions of law: (1) Does the Utah Nonprofit Corporation Act apply to this
Association which is properly organized and operated as a nonprofit corporation? (2) If so, are
these Trustees held to the standard of care set forth in that statute for officers and directorsintentional misconduct? The answer to both of these questions is yes. Because Appellants have
never alleged intentional misconduct on the part of the Trustees, there simply is no legal basis to
sustain an action against the Trustees. Accordingly, the district court properly granted
Defendants/Appellees' motion to dismiss and this Court should affirm that decision.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Association is Properly Organized as a Nonprofit Corporation and the Utah
Nonprofit Corporation and Co-operative Association Act Applies
A fundamental premise of Appellants' complaint is that, notwithstanding the organization

of the American Towers Owners Association as a nonprofit corporation, the standard of care
established under the Utah Nonprofit Corporation and Co-operative Association Act (the
"Nonprofit Corporation Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-54 to -112 (1996), does not apply. Instead,
Appellants claim that the Utah Condominium Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-1 to -36 (1994) (the
"Condominium Act"), supersedes the Nonprofit Corporation Act in its entirety. However, the
3

The Trustees reasoned in part that they could use the Association's reserves
because any proceeds derived from the CCI Litigation would be deposited into the reserve
account. Although it occurred after the record in the matter, it is nevertheless undisputed that on
February 6, 1997, the underlying litigation with CCI was settled and $425,000 was deposited into
the Association's reserve account.
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Condominium Act does not contain a standard of care to govern the conduct of condominium
trustees. Appellants are therefore left with a policy argument that it makes more sense for
condominium associations to be treated as "for-profit corporations" notwithstanding that they are
organized as nonprofit corporations. They ask this Court to add an exception to the Nonprofit
Corporation Act that if the nonprofit corporation has as one of its functions the management of a
condominium, the standard of care applicable to "for-profit corporations" should apply. The
legislature chose not to add Appellants' exception, this Court too should decline Appellants'
invitation to legislate.4
While Appellants make a strenuous argument that the Nonprofit Corporation Act should
not apply, they nowhere allege that this Association is not properly organized and operated as a
nonprofit corporation. A "nonprofit corporation" is defined as one which "does not distribute any
part of its income to its members, trustees, or officers, and includes a nonprofit cooperative
association." Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-19(11) (1996). Appellants have never alleged that this
Association distributes profits to members, trustees, or officers. Accordingly, regardless of how
other condominium owners associations may be operated, there is no basis to allege that this
Association is not a nonprofit corporation, governed accordingly by the Nonprofit Corporation
Act.

4

Appellants raise for the first time a unique claim that the "due process rights" of
individual homeowners have been violated. As noted earlier, a claim raised for the first time on
appeal asserting an individual cause of action in a derivative suit is improper. They also
disregard the rather fundamental requirement that they must allege "state action" to implicate the
due process clause. See Shelley v. Kraemer. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). However, since Appellants find
analogy to municipal government so appealing, perhaps they should examine the analogy to be
drawn to the doctrine of governmental immunity as well as the means by which a dissatisfied
citizen changes the manner in which it is governed — through election of new officials.
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Appellants' policy argument is not only specious, it is factually wrong. First, regardless of
whether condominium associations ought to be organized as for-profit corporations or nonprofit
corporations is irrelevant. The fact is that this Association has been organized as a nonprofit
corporation. Appellants have not challenged that status nor sought its dissolution.5 Moreover, the
"overwhelming majority of corporate [property owners associations] are organized on a nonprofit
basis." Robert G. Natelson, Law of Property Owners Associations § 3.2.2.2 at 74 (1989 & Supp.
1996). Indeed, only one jurisdiction even expressly allows condominium owner associations to be
incorporated as for-profit corporations, see Fla. Stat. Ann. § 718.11 l(l)(a). Thus, even
Appellants' policy argument begins to unravel.
Appellants' textual argument that the Condominium Act supersedes the Nonprofit
Corporation Act is even more tenuous. The argument is contrary to the text of the Condominium
Act and inconsistent with general principles of statutory construction. The Condominium Act
provides:
The provisions of [the Act] shall be in addition and supplemental to all other
provisions of law, statutory or judicially declared, provided that wherever the
application of the provisions of this act conflict with the application of such other
provisions, this act shall prevail.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-35(1) (emphasis added). The Condominium Act thus supplements the
Nonprofit Corporation Act where the two do not conflict. In an attempt to disguise the fact that
the two acts do not conflict on the issue of officer and director liability, Appellants cite other
alleged differences between the Acts. See App. Br. at 33-34. The two Acts do not conflict,
5

Appellants rely extensively throughout their brief on Turner v. Hi-Country
Homeowner's Ass'n.. 910 P.2d 1223 (Utah 1996). Appellants fail to note, however, that the
association in that case, like the Association here and the "overwhelming majority" of
condominium associations around the nation, was organized as a nonprofit corporation. Id at
1224.
morgan\plead\amtowbn 627

12

however, on the central issue of this case because only the Nonprofit Corporation Act establishes a
standard of care for officers and directors. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-107(1). Appellants'
argument that the Condominium Act displaces the Nonprofit Corporation Act is impaled on the
point that they must look to a third act, the for-profit corporation code to supply the standard of
care which they claim the Condominium Act somehow displaces from the Nonprofit Corporation
Act.
It is a fundamental tenet of statutory construction that a court will interpret statutes to make
the statute harmonious with other statutes relevant to the subject matter. Business Aviation v.
Medivest Inc.. 882 P.2d 662, 666 (Utah 1994); Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth.. 618 P.2d 480, 481
(Utah 1980); see also Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991) (courts
strive to avoid "absurd meaning" in statutory interpretation). It also is fundamental that
"[p]rovisions in an act which are omitted in another act relating to the same subject matter will be
applied in a proceeding under the other act, when not inconsistent with its purpose." Murray City
v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983).
Not surprisingly, there are differences between the Condominium Act and the Nonprofit
Corporation Act. One statute regulates all condominium associations, whether incorporated or not
-- the other statute regulates all nonprofit corporations, regardless of their underlying purpose.
Differences between two statutes, however, do not translate into irreconcilable conflict. The
failed savings and loan cases are instructive in this regard. In FDIC v. Isham. 777 F. Supp. 828 (D.
Colo. 1991) cited by Appellants, the U.S. District Court held that section 1821 of FIRREA, which
provided a "gross negligence" standard for directors of federally insured savings and loans, did not
serve to limit director liability in those states that imposed a higher standard of care, i.e.,
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negligence. Id at 832. Similarly, in FDIC v. Canfield. 957 F.2d 786 (10th Cir.V aff d. 967 F.2d
443 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc), the Tenth Circuit held that "[n]o reasonable construction of 'may'
[in FIRREA] suggests that it limits the liability of officers or directors to gross negligence. In
other words, in states where an officer or director may be held liable for simple negligence, the
FDIC may rely on state law to enable its action." Canfield, 957 F.2d at 788. Thus, as these cases
demonstrate, the permissive language in one statute is not "contrary" to the mandatory language of
another statute.
In this case, the Appellants make much about the mandatory nature of the Condominium Act
versus the permissible provisions of the Nonprofit Corporation Act. See App. Br. at 33-34. There
is, however, no conflict in relevant provisions. Nothing in the Condominium Act is inconsistent
with the Nonprofit Corporation Act. There are mandatory provisions in the Condominium Act
which are permissive in the Nonprofit Corporation Act. This simply means that, just as with the
savings and loan cases, where one statute provides a standard, that standard will be imposed. And,
where one Act is silent, the provisions of the other Act will control. See Murray City. 663 P.2d at
1318. For example, under the Condominium Act, bylaws are mandatory, see Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-8-10; under the Nonprofit Corporation Act, bylaws are discretionary, see Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-6-44. Thus, a condominium association organized as a nonprofit corporation in Utah must
have bylaws.
The American Towers Owners Association was incorporated as a nonprofit corporation and
thus is governed by the Nonprofit Corporation Act. See Decl. Art. XX § 20.02, Complaint Ex. A
[R. at 85] (emphasis added) ("This Declaration shall be governed by and construed in accordance
with the laws of the State of Utah . . . . The provisions hereof shall be in addition and
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supplemental to the provisions of the Condominium Act and all other provisions of applicable
law."). The Association's Bylaws refer specifically to the Nonprofit Corporation Act:
Pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Nonprofit Corporation and
Cooperative Association Act, the Board of Trustees of American Towers
Owners Association, a Utah nonprofit corporation, hereby adopts the
following Bylaws for such nonprofit corporation.
Bylaws, Complaint Ex. B, at 45 (emphasis added). [R at 111.]
By its express terms the Nonprofit Corporation Act, including the standard of care, applies
to: "(a) all corporations organized under this chapter." There is no exception for owners
associations. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-20(l)(a).
The treatise cited extensively by Appellants, Liability of Corporate Officers & Directors,
similarly notes that:
Some condominium associations are subject to both state condominium
statute and state nonprofit corporation laws. While there are similarities
among state condominium acts, there are also substantial differences.
Accordingly, generalized observations as to questions of tort liability are
not possible.
1 W.E. Knepper & D.A. Bailey, Liability of Corporate Officers & Directors § 12-3(c) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added). Such "generalized observations as to questions of tort liability" are
exactly what Appellants attempt to present. In doing so, however, Appellants ignore established
Utah law on the liability of officers and directors of nonprofit organizations and its standard of
intentional misconduct. These two statutes may be read harmoniously and Appellants' argument
that the Condominium Act entirely supersedes the Nonprofit Corporation Act is not well taken.6
6

The transcript of the district court argument, to the extent it is accurate, indicates
that Judge Young stated that the Utah Revised Model Business Corporation Act is implicated
here and that the Nonprofit Corporation Act "goes, if at all, to torts." [R. 496.] Although the
transcript omits it, Judge Young appears to be merely restating the Appellants' argument which
he clearly rejects in holding that the only applicable standard of care is intentional misconduct.
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II.

Individual Trustees of the Association May Be Held Liable For Contracts of the
Association Only if the Trustee Engages in Intentional Misconduct
Appellants have advanced a most unusual argument for holding the individual Trustees

liable. Appellants first state that the Declaration and Bylaws, together with the provisions of the
Condominium Act form a "contract" between individual owners and the Association. App. Br. at
17. This unremarkable proposition is indeed the law in Utah. See Turner v. Hi-Country
Homeowner's Ass'n.. 910 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Utah 1996). Appellants go on to assert, however,
that the Trustees can be sued individually for actions taken by them in their capacity as board
members because, in their role as owners, each of these individuals is "bound strictly to comply
with the Declarations and Bylaws." App. Br. at 18. This argument finds no support in statutory or
case law. First, the argument suffers from a fatal technical flaw because there is simply no
contract between the owners and individual Trustees. Under fundamental principles of agency, as
agents of the corporation, directors are not liable for a "contract" of the corporation unless they
breach the standard of care they owe the corporation. Second, Appellants' "strict compliance"
argument is contrary to the text of the statute, the Declaration, and the Bylaws.
A.

The Owners, Acting Derivatively, Lack Standing to Sue the Trustees

The Appellants claim that the Trustee breached the Association's Declarations by spending
reserves without authorization. However, the obligation which the owners claim was breached is
an obligation of the "Association." The "Association shall establish an adequate reserve to cover

[R. 497.] If the district court was stating its own reasoning rather than restating Appellants'
argument, this misstatement of the law is harmless in this context and the Court can affirm the
order of the district court although one of his stated reasons is incorrect. See Berube v. Fashion
Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1039 (Utah 1989) ("[W]e will affirm the trial court on any proper
ground, even if the court below assigned an incorrect reason for its ruling."); see also Stephens v.
Bonneville Travel Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997).
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the cost of reasonably predictable repairs and replacements." Section 19.05. This is not an
undertaking by the Trustees or by the owners and there is no other provision in the Declaration that
dictates how reserves are to be spent or even mentions reserves or reserve funds.
The Appellants, acting derivatively, have not stated a cause of action against the Trustees
based on contract. Citing Turner v. Hi-Country Homeowner's Ass'n.. 910 P.2d 1223 (Utah 1996),
Appellants correctly note that the Utah Supreme Court held that corporate bylaws, together with
the articles of incorporation, the statute under which it was incorporated,7 and the member's
application constitute a contract "between the member and the corporation." IcL at 1225.
However, Appellants have not cited a single case for the bizarre proposition that individual
Trustees are bound by the "contract between the association and owners," a contract to which these
individual Trustees are not a party. As Appellants' cases demonstrate, the parties to the "contract"
are the association on one side and the individual owners on the other. Thus, an association could
sue an individual owner for breach of contract (see Turner. 910 P.2d at 1225), or an owner might
sue the association for a breach (see Wolinski v. Kadison. 449 N.E.2d 151, 156-57 (111. Ct. App.
1983)), but there is no provision in the law for an association to sue its agent, i.e., its director, for a
breach of a contract to which the director did not agree.
The agreement to establish a reserve account is between the Association and the owners.
The Association undertakes to raise money to establish adequate reserves. The owners promise to
pay assessments to fund the Association's obligations. If the Appellants' argument were to
prevail, an Association that failed to assess its members for an adequate reserve could merely sue

7

Appellants do not concern themselves with the fact that part of the contract they
claim is breached is the Nonprofit Corporation Act which insulates directors from liability for all
of their actions except "intentional misconduct."
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the directors on the contract and make claim to their personal assets to fulfill the obligation of the
Association. There is no support for such an absurd result. The Trustees are liable to pay an
obligation of the Association only if their failure to assess the owners or their use of the reserves
was a violation of the applicable standard of care -- intentional misconduct.
It is fundamental that "a corporation only acts through agents. The directors are the
managing agents

" Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh. 149 U.S. 368, 382 (1893). The

Trustees of the Association are agents of the Association. In Carlie v. Morgan. 922 P.2d 1 (Utah
1996), the Utah Supreme Court rejected the notion that an agent could be held liable on the
contractual obligation of his or her principal. KL at 6. Again, this is an unremarkable proposition
adopted in literally every jurisdiction and set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency: "[A]
person making or purporting to make a contract with another as agent for a disclosed principal
does not become party to the contract.... One bringing an action on the contract has the burden
of showing that the other is a party to it." Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 343 (1957); see 3
Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 302 (1986) ("If a contract is made with a known agent acting within the
scope of his authority for a disclosed principal, the contract is that of the principal alone and the
agent cannot be held liable thereon."). See also Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp.. 12 F.3d 1170,
1177 (2d Cir. 1993) ("A director is not personally liable for his corporation's contractual breaches
unless he assumed personal liability, acted in bad faith or committed a tort in connection with the
performance of the contract.").
In this case, as in the agreement, to establish a reserve account does not require that the
Trustees personally fund it. By its terms it is between the Association and the individual owners.
If the Association breached this contract in funding the CCI Litigation from the Association's
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reserves, then the individual owners may have a cause of action against the Association. The
Association would be required to assess its members to establish or augment the reserves. Any
claim that the Association has against its agent Trustees, however, would derive exclusively from
the Trustees' breach of the applicable standard of care, in this case, intentional misconduct. The
Association simply has no direct cause of action against the Trustees based on the "contract."
Stated another way, the Trustees were not party to the contract between the Association and the
owners and may not, therefore, be sued directly upon that contract.8 Appellants' claims based on
breach of contract were properly dismissed.
B.

Neither the Text of the Declaration and Bylaws Nor the Law Dictate that the
Trustees "Strictly Comply" With the "Contract"

Aside from the legal incongruity presented by Appellants' argument, it is inconsistent with
the text of the Declaration and Bylaws as well as the law of this state. Section 18.01 of the
Declaration, on its face, applies solely to owners, not Trustees:
18.01. Compliance. Each Owner shall comply strictly with the provisions of this
Declaration, the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of the Association, rules and
regulations promulgated by the Association as herein provided, and the decisions and
resolutions of the Association adopted pursuant thereto, as the same may lawfully be
modified and amended from time to time. [R. at 83.]
Recognizing the futility in arguing that this section imposes a duty of strict compliance upon
individual Trustees, Appellants next quote § 9.01 of the Bylaws, claiming that this section creates

8

Appellants feign incredulity at the proposition that a contract claim may involve a
tort standard of care. See App. Br. at 20 ("No case authority exists, and the Trustees cited none
below, that would permit, much less require, dismissal of the breach of contract claims for failure
to meet a tort standard of conduct."). Appellants' argument, however, evinces their basic
misunderstanding as to whom the parties to the "contract" were. A more preposterous
proposition would be holding a party liable on a contract to which he or she was not a party.
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a "reciprocal duty" of strict compliance for the Trustees. App. Br. at 18. Section 9.01 does no
such thing. It relates solely to rules and regulations:
9.01. Rules and Regulations. The Board of Trustees may from time to
time adopt, amend, repeal, and enforce reasonable rules and regulations
governing the use and operation of the Project; provided, however, that
such rules and regulations shall not be inconsistent with the rights and
duties set forth in the Articles of Incorporation, the Declaration, or these
Bylaws.
[R. at 121.]
Section 9.01 goes on to provide that rules and regulations relating to the use of the residential
and commercial areas must be approved by a majority of the Trustees representing those respective
groups and further providing that the members must be provided copies of all rules and regulations
adopted by the Board. LI Even a cursory reading of this provision reveals that it does not serve to
create some type of "reciprocal duty" upon individual Trustees. It relates to rulemaking authority
and nothing more. This litigation does not involve rulemaking. Thus, Section 9.01 is wholly
inapplicable.
Neither the text of the Declaration and Bylaws nor the text of Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-89
require Trustees to "strictly comply" with the Declaration and Bylaws because such a notion is
contrary to the purpose of the strict compliance requirement. The very cases cited by Appellants
demonstrate this point. See, e.g.. Turner. 910 P.2d at 1225; Appeal of Two Crow Ranch. Inc.. 494
9

This section provides:

Each unit owner shall comply strictly with the covenants, conditions and
restrictions as set forth in the declaration or in the deed to his unit, and with the bylaws
and/or house rules and with the administrative rules and regulations drafted pursuant
thereto . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-8 (1996). It is obvious that this section serves to regulate the conduct of
owners qua owners, not owners qua trustees.
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P.2d 915, 919 (Mont. 1972); Jorgensen Realty. Inc. v. Box. 701 P.2d 1256, 1257 (Colo. Ct. App.
1985).
C.

The Trustees Have "Strictly Complied" With the "Contract"

Although owners are bound to "strictly comply" with the contract formed by the Declaration,
Bylaws, relevant statute, and the owners' individual applications, neither the text of these
provisions nor the law supports a contention that individual Trustees thereby become "strictly" and
personally liable for the obligations of the Association. Even if this Court were to accept
Appellants' argument and conclude that the individual Trustees of a nonprofit corporation are
bound to "strictly comply" with a provision of the contract not directed to them, this Court should
still affirm the district court's dismissal because the Trustees have strictly complied. In this case,
strict compliance with the Declaration and Bylaws, for Trustees who are given "all of the powers
of the Association, whether derived from law or the Articles of Incorporation," [Bylaws, f 4.01, R.
at 114.], means simply that the Trustees will not do anything which they are affirmatively
prohibited from doing, either by law, the Declaration, or the Bylaws.10
The only provision in the Declaration or Bylaws which addresses the Association's reserve
account is Section 19.05 of the Declaration which provides:
The Association shall establish an adequate reserve to cover the cost of
reasonably predictable and necessary repairs and replacements of the
Common Areas and any component thereof and shall cause such reserve to
be funded by regular monthly or other periodic assessments against the
Condominiums rather than by Special Assessments.

10

Appellants' analogy to municipal government also breaks down here. Appellants
argue that, like a city, the Board's power is strictly limited to express powers and those implied
powers reasonably necessary to carry out express powers. App. Br. at 37 n.l 1 (citing Layton City
v. Speth. 578 P.2d 828 (Utah 1978)). The text of the Bylaws is to the contrary, granting the
Board all powers under law except those specifically reserved to the owners. [Bylaws, ^f 4.01].
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[R. at 84.] This provision is unambiguous and the Court can interpret its meaning from the words
used. Turner, 910 P.2d at 1226. The provision plainly does not prohibit the Association from
electing to sue a contractor for faulty work as a means of effecting "repair" of the Project. Thus,
this is an area in which the Trustees may exercise the broad discretion granted them under the
Declaration and Bylaws. See Decl. at 110.03 ("The Association may obtain and pay for the
services of such personnel as the Association shall determine to be necessary or desirable for the
proper operation of the Project.... The Association may obtain and pay for legal and accounting
services necessary or desirable in connection with the operation of the Project or the enforcement
of this Declaration.") [R. at 67.]; Bylaws, f 4.01 (granting Board power to manage affairs of
Association) [R. at 114.]. Exercise of discretion granted them cannot, as a matter of law, be
considered a failure on the part of the Board to "strictly comply" with the Declaration and Bylaws.
D.

Appellants' Fiduciary Duty Claim

Appellants claim that the Trustees have a fiduciary obligation to the owners. Appellees do
not disagree. The fiduciary duty owed by officers and directors of any nonprofit corporation is
defined as the duties of loyalty and care. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hess. 820 F. Supp. 1359,
1366 (D. Utah 1993). Appellants do not claim that the Trustees breached their duty of loyalty.
App. Br. at 29 n.5 ("The Complaint does not allege a breach of the duty of loyalty."). Thus, the
only claim by the Appellants is that the Trustees breached their duty of care.
In Hess, the directors of a failed savings and loan were being sued for negligence and breach
of fiduciary duty. While Hess involved the standard of care for directors of a for-profit
corporation, the court's holding is applicable here:
In Utah, the fiduciary duty of care is simply the level of care state law
requires a director to exercise in managing corporate affairs. That is the
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identical standard of ordinary negligence which underlies a claim for negligent mismanagement.
Accordingly, it is this court's judgment that under Utah law, a claim for breach of a director's
fiduciary duty of care is tantamount to a claim of negligent mismanagement. See Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (treating a claim for breach of fiduciary duty of care
under Delaware law the same as a negligence claim).
Id. at 1366 (emphasis added). This Court recently employed the reasoning of Hess in C&Y Corp.
v. General Biometrics. Inc.. 896 P.2d 47 (Utah App. 1995). There, as here, directors allegedly
breached their fiduciary duties. This Court concluded:
[Gen Bio] argues Condie and Yarter breached their obligation of good
faith and fair dealing. Our fiduciary duty analysis effectively disposes of
this issue. Cf Resolution Trust Corp.. 820 F. Supp. at 1366 (refusing to
address breach of fiduciary duty claim as duplicative of negligence claim).
14 at 56.
Under C&Y and Hess, the breadth of the fiduciary duty of care owed by a corporate director
is gauged by the standard of care set forth in the applicable statute. For nonprofit directors the
"level of care state law requires a director to exercise in managing corporate affairs" is intentional
misconduct. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-107. All other allegations which embody a higher standard
of care must be dismissed.11
III. The Trustees Have Not Committed Any Ultra Vires Act
Appellants take the same shotgun approach to ultra vires analysis that they do to the
fiduciary duty analysis. However, Appellants confuse the "authority" of the Association to take

11

The cases cited by Appellants do not support their fiduciary duty claim. For
example, in Wolinski v. Kadison. 449 N.E. 2d 151 (111. Ct. App. 1983), the governing board
flagrantly violated a voting requirement "made explicitly in the bylaws." LI at 156.
Significantly, the plaintiff in Wolinksi alleged "wilful and wanton" misconduct on the part of
individual board members, an allegation which the court concluded stated a separate cause of
action. Id. at 157. No such allegation was made here.
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certain actions with the means by which the Trustees elect to execute such authorized action.12 An
action is ultra vires only if it exceeds the express or implied authority of the corporation as fixed
by its charter, statute, or the common law. 7A William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the
Law of Private Corporations §3399 (perm. ed. 1989). An action that is authorized, but which did
not result from the observance of proper corporate formalities is not ultra vires. Id §§ 34013402; see Independence One Mortg. Corp. v. Gillespie. 672 A.2d 1279, 1281 (NJ. Super. 1996)
{ultra vires where official "utterly without capacity" to perform an act; intra vires where act is
authorized, although imperfectly executed); 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2012 (1985) (an
"intra vires" act is one that is taken without proper authorization of the directors or shareholders).
Statutory provisions dealing with ultra vires transactions have no bearing on intra vires acts. Id.
Appellants attempt to cast their challenge to the Association's prosecution of the CCI
Litigation as an "ultra vires" act on the part of the Trustees.13 This challenge is baseless, however,

12

Appellants continue misleadingly to cite case law. In S&T Anchorage v. Lewis,
575 So.2d 696 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991), the court affirmed dismissal of the plaintiffs' breach of
fiduciary duty claim. Id at 698. That case does not stand for the proposition that "[c]ourts
consider an ultra vires act to be a breach of fiduciary duty, or breach of contract, to which the
intentional misconduct standard for torts clearly would not apply." App. Br. at 25.
13

Were this Court to accept Appellants' argument, nonprofit directors would be
placed in a "damned if you do; damned if you don't" posture. It has been held that failing to sue
may be an ultra vires giving away of corporate assets. See Helvering v. Davis. 301 U.S. 619
(1937). Thus, under Appellants' argument, nonprofit directors such as the Trustees here may face
personal liability based on ultra vires conduct if they elect to pursue litigation and they may
similarly face personal liability if they elect not to pursue litigation. Utah law, however, protects
directors from such a Hobson's Choice:
A trustee or officer of a nonprofit corporation is not personally liable to the
corporation or its members for civil claims arising from acts or omissions made in
the performance of his duties as a trustee or officer, unless the acts or omissions
are the result of his intentional misconduct.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-107(1).
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because the Association, acting through the Trustees, is authorized to sue and be sued: "A
corporation is in law, for civil purposes, deemed a person. It may be sue and be sued, grant and
receive, and do all other acts not ultra vires which a natural person could do." Railroad Co. v.
Harris. 79 U.S. 65, 81 (1870); see Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-22; id § 16-10a-302(l) (business
corporations).
Appellants' argument is difficult to fathom. There can be no question that the prosecution of
the CCI Litigation was authorized. In Utah, a nonprofit corporation may "sue and be sued,
complain and defend, in its corporate name." Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-22(2). Furthermore, under
the Condominium Act, the management committee (in this case, the Association, acting through
the Board of Trustees, see Decl. f 10.07 [R. at 67] is empowered to bring suit on behalf of the
Association. Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-33. And the Supreme Court has read this provision broadly,
holding that such a management committee is "cloaked with the statutory right to sue."14
Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n. Man. Comm. v. Gibbons Realty Co.. 668 P.2d 535, 542 (Utah
1983). Finally, the Association Bylaws expressly grant to the Board of Trustees the authority to
"exercise all of the powers of the Association" derived from law or Articles, except such powers
as are vested solely in the members. Bylaws % 4.01. [R. at 114.] As such, Appellants' argument
that the Trustees' decision to pursue and finance the litigation against CCI was ultra vires is
simply wrong.
In their opening brief, Appellants drum out a parade of horribles which are supposed to
demonstrate the '"ultra vires' conduct" engaged in by the Trustees. App. Br. at 27. A careful
analysis of this very list, however, demonstrates the impropriety of Appellants' argument. For
14

Given this express power, it follows that the Trustees necessarily have the implied
necessary power to finance litigation. Decl. f 10.08. [R. at 68.]
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example, Appellants claim that the Trustees committed an ultra vires act by "[vjoting in a secret
meeting to fund OQI from the Reserve Fund/' Id Even assuming the truth of this allegationwhich the Trustees would dispute-there is nothing in the Declaration, Bylaws, Nonprofit
Corporation Act, or the Condominium Act which even defines, much less expressly prohibits the
Trustees from conducting "secret meetings," whatever that term means. If Appellants are claiming
that the meetings were not properly noticed, see Bylaws, f 4.06 [R. at 115] Utah Code Ann. § 166-39, that is a waivable defect and plainly does not constitute an ultra vires act. If the Appellants
are complaining because the owners were not given notice of the Board meeting, it goes without
saying that that contention is without merit. Notice of Directors' meeting generally is not given to
shareholders. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-39; see also Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-322(l). Thus,
under Appellants' rationale, all meetings of all boards of directors would be considered "secret."
Given that the pursuit of the CCI Litigation was not ultra vires, the means by which the
Trustees financed the litigation falls squarely within the business judgment rule. Stated simply, the
Trustees reasonably believed, allegedly on the advice of tte Associations' lawyer and accountant,
that the CCI Litigation could be financed with monies from the Association's reserves. Nothing in
the Declaration prohibits such use. Accordingly, whether this Court—or any court—were to
determine that the reserves were not the proper source of funds for the CCI Litigation does not
make the Trustees good-faith decision to use those funds an ultra vires act. It was, at the very
most, an erroneous judgment. The law simply does not impose liability on nonprofit corporate
directors for errors in judgment. See Dockside Ass'n. Inc. v. Detyens. 352 S.E.2d 714, 716 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1987) ("A court should be reluctant to question action taken intra vires by the governing
board of a nonprofit corporation."); see also Gleason v. International Multifoods Corp.. 577 P.2d
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931, 934 (Ore. 1978) ("If there are plausible business reasons supportive of the decision of the
board of directors, and such reasons can be given credence, a Court will not interfere with a
corporate board's right to make that decision. It is not our function to referee every corporate
squabble or disagreement. It is our duty to redress wrongs, not to settle competitive business
interests. Absent any bad faith, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty or abuse of discretion, no wrong
cognizable or correctable in the Courts has occurred."); Gay v. Gay's Supermarkets. Inc.. 343 A.2d
577, 580 (Me. 1975); cf Jov v. North. 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) cert denied. 460 U.S.
1051 (1983); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Blasdell. 903 F. Supp. 417, 425 (D. Ariz. 1994)
(articulating "complete abdication" standard of care in for-profit ultra vires analysis).
Appellants' argument is not that the Trustees did not have the authority to pursue the
CCI Litigation on behalf of the Association, but that they disagree with the source of funds the
Trustees used to finance the CCI Litigation. Appellants' remedy for their dissatisfaction with the
Board's decision, however, is not to bring a derivative action and to seek judicial intervention in
this "corporate squabble," see Gleason. 577 P.2d at 934. Their remedy is to rally their neighbors
and remove Board members according to the procedure set forth in the Bylaws. See Bylaws K 4.09
[R. at 116]. Having tried and having failed in that effort, see Amen. Verif. Complaint, f 99 [R. at
213], they have elected to pursue litigation.
In this case, Appellants challenge the Board's decision regarding financing of the CCI
Litigation. The Trustees were faced with a decision as to how to remedy defects in the Project. As
Judge Young observed, the Board could have hired a second plumbing contractor to redo the work
or it could have chosen to sue the first contractor. The Board chose the latter. According to
Appellants' rationale, the Board could have paid a new plumbing contractor from the
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Association's reserves, but they are subject to personal liability for seeking redress from CCI
Mechanical. The Board's decision was, pure and simple, a business decision. Absent some
explicit provision to the contrary, director liability should not turn on whether the remedy a board
seeks involves paper versus pipe. The rule protecting valid and informed business decisions ~
regardless of whether all shareholders agree - is designed to protect Trustees from the "most
imperfect device" of "after-the-fact litigation." Joy. 692 F.2d at 886; see also Ungeleider v. One
Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp.. 623 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Ap. Ct. N.Y. 1995), Papalexiou v. Tower West
Condominium. 401 A.2d 280, 285-87 (N.J. Super. 1979) (business judgment rule requires
"presence of fraud or lack of good faith in the conduct of corporation's internal affairs before the
decisions of a board of directors can be questioned").
Assuming that financing the litigation from the Association's reserves could be considered
an unauthorized act, the Trustees still are not liable because they are not alleged to have committed
an act they knew to be wrong. In Simon v. Socony-Oil Vacuum Co.. 38 N.Y. S.2d 270 (N.Y.
1942), the court held that, in order for a director to be held liable for an ultra vires act, the director
must have committed the act "knowingly." Id. at 274. Because the directors in that case "did not
knowingly exceed their authority or the authority of the corporation," the court held that they could
not be held personally liable for damages. Id.15

15

Appellants, claim that the intentional misconduct standard does not apply in ultra
vires analysis. That statement is plainly incorrect. A director must know the extent of his or her
authority and wilfully intend to violate it before personal liability attaches. See Simon. 38 N.Y.
S. 2d at 274-75; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-19-2 (shielding volunteer directors from liability
absent wilful, knowing violation).
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In this case, the Declaration and Bylaws did not unambiguously prohibit the Trustees from
financing the litigation to repair building defects from the Association's reserves.16 They are
alleged to have acted on professional advice. Thus, there was no way for the Trustees to know that
such conduct might later be judged to be ultra vires. Where directors "act honestly, and for what
they regard as the best interests of the corporation and do not wilfully prevent or exceed their
powers but only misjudge the same, on the plainest principles of justice, as well as under the
adjudicated cases, they could not be held liable." 2 Thompson on Corporation, § 1404 (perm. ed.).
Appellants have not alleged willful violation of the Declaration and Bylaws. Indeed they allege
the contrary, that the directors acted upon the advice of the Association's lawyers and accountants.
Amen. Verif. Complaint ^ 92 [R. at 212]. Accordingly, their claim of ultra vires acts must fail.
IV. Appellants9 Claim of Corporate Mismanagement Falls With its Breach of Fiduciary
Duty Claim
Continuing to pound the table, Appellants assert that "[t]he Complaint alleges a legally
sufficient claim for Corporate Mismanagement and Waste and Assets (Count VIII) through the
Trustees' failure to exercise due care to see that the Capital Reserve Fund was used for the
Association's benefit and not wasted." App. Br. at 29. This is simply a rehashing of the same
mistaken argument that Appellants advance throughout their brief; that is, notwithstanding the
Association's organization as a nonprofit corporation, the court should impose a simple negligence

16

For the financing of the CCI Litigation from the Association's reserves to
constitute an ultra vires act, the Declaration and Bylaws must affirmatively and unambiguously
prohibit such action. In the cases cited by Appellants, directors breached just such unambiguous
provisions. See Johnson v. Fairfax Village Condominium IV Unit Owners Ass'n.. 548 A.2d 87,
90 (D.C. Ct. App. 1988); Pepe v. Whispering Sands Condominium Ass'n.. 351 So.2d 755, 75758 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972); S&T Anchorage. Inc. v. Lewis. 575 So.2d 696, 698 (Fla. Ct. App.
1991).
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standard of care upon the Trustees rather than the intentional misconduct standard set forth in the
statute.
As discussed above, Appellants' argument is contrary to law.17 The Trustees do have a
fiduciary duty of care to the Association and that "duty of care is simply the level of care state law
requires a director to exercise in managing corporate affairs." Hess. 820 F. Supp. at 1366.
Because Appellants have not pled intentional misconduct on the part of the Trustees, their
corporate mismanagement claim falls right along side their breach of fiduciary duty claim.
V.

Appellants Are Not Entitled to Attorneys Fees or an Incentive Fee
Appellants assert an entitlement to attorneys fees and an incentive fee. Attorneys fees and

expenses may be awarded when a derivative action confers substantial benefit on the corporation.
Rosenbaum v. McAllister. 64 F.3d 1439, 1441 (10th Cir. 1995). The obvious corollary to the
common-fund doctrine, however, is that the litigation must in fact confer a benefit on the
corporation. Appellants' Complaint has been dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The
action plainly has not conferred any benefit on the Association.

17

Appellants' own cases repudiate the very proposition advanced. For example, in
Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n.. a homeowner attempted, as Appellants do, to hold
directors personally liable for an alleged breach of the association's bylaws. The California
Supreme Court dismissed the action, noting:
The board members may not be held personally liable absent allegations that they
entered into a contract with plaintiff on their own behalf or purported to bind
themselves personally.
723 P.2d 573, 586 n.20 (Cal. 1986); see also Board of Managers v. Fairway at N. Hills. 603
N.Y.S.2d 867, 868 (App. 1993) (dismissing a breach of contract claim against a condominium
association trustee "as the claim[] improperly sought to impose personal liability upon him for
alleged misdeeds committed by him in his capacity as a corporate officer.").
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VI. The District Court's "Speculation" is Irrelevant
Appellants go on for eleven pages about the impropriety of the district court's "speculation"
regarding certain matters. This argument is unnecessary and misleading. This court has the
transcript of the hearing before it. Although the transcript appears to be garbled in a number of
instances the Court can evaluate for itself whether Judge Young was "speculating" or whether he
was attempting to clarify the unusual argument being advanced by the Appellants through the
traditional method of what-if hypotheticals. In any event, the failure of Appellants' claims does
not rest on the district court's hypotheticals; the Complaint fails as a matter of law because the
Appellants have not alleged that the Trustees engaged in intentional misconduct. Judge Young
clearly so held and any other comments by this Court are irrelevant to the correct decision Judge
Young reached. See Berube supra. This inescapable legal failing stands completely apart from
any "speculation" on the part of the district court.
VII. Appellants Have Waived Their Right to Amend the Complahit
In the final sentence of their opening brief, Appellants seek the alternative ruling of he Court
for "leave to amend further to allege intentional misconduct. App. Br. at 50. At the conclusion of
the hearing in this matter, the Court dismissed the Complaint with prejudice, stating - - "the
directors are only to be held liable for intentional misconduct, and thus that must be pled in that
way in order for them to be liable." [R. at 497.] Counsel for appellants sought clarification of the
Court's ruling:
Mr. Gesas:

Just so the record is clear, is that with prejudice, or with leave to amend if we
have to proceed.
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The Court:

I will provide the opportunity to plead with leave to amend. [R. at 497-98.]18

Appellants had a choice: Either amend the Complaint or treat the dismissal as final and
appeal. Appellants chose the latter.
Appellants filed the instant appeal of a final order pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Having elected to treat the district court's dismissal as final and pursue this
appeal, Appellants have waived their right to further amend. See Williams v. State. 716 P.2d 806
(Utah 1986).
Appellants, like the plaintiff in Williams, seek to have their cake and eat it too. They filed
this appeal of an order they elected to treat as final. Yet, they want to treat the order as non-final,
and be allowed to amend their Complaint if they lose in this forum. The law does not allow such
tactics. Appellants waived their right to amend the Complaint when they filed the instant appeal.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court and the case should not be remanded with
leave to amend.

18

The Order Granting Motion to Dismiss provides: ". .. the Court finds that the
only applicable standard of care for directors or trustees of Utah nonprofit condominium
associations is intentional misconduct. Consequently the court dismisses the entire Amended
Complaint, including the contract claims with prejudice, and grants the Appellants' leave to
amend to assert only claims for intentional misconduct." [R. 376.]
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court dismissing Appellants' Complaint
should be AFFIRMED.
DATED this ^ T j f d a y of June, 1997.
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR, LLC

By:
Brent V. Manning
JackM. MorgaiOr.
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees
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